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BASTARDY AND THE STATUTE OF 
WILLS: INTERPRETING A SIXTEENTH-
CENTURY STATUTE WITH CASES AND 
READINGS 
M.C. Mirow· 
The Statute cif Wills of 1540 created a tax loophole for 
transfers of property to illegitimate children. 1 Assessments for 
* Assistant Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law; Samuel I. Golieb 
Fellow in Legal History, New York University, 1998-1999. This study stems from 
work done under the supervision of Professor J .H. Baker whom I thank for his 
guidance and suggestions. I thank Professors Barry Cushman, Catherine 
McCauliff, Kenneth Parker, Bernard Rudden, and Christopher Tomlins who com-
mented on this work. Members of the Center for Comparative Legal History, 
University of Chicago, and members of the New York University Legal History 
Colloquium have provided useful criticism. Portions of the research for this article 
have been financially supported by the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Prin-
cipals of the Universities of the United Kingdom; the Cambridge Overseas Trust, 
Cambridge University; the Frederic William Maitland Fund, Faculty of Law, Cam-
bridge University; the Master and Fellows of Gonville and Caius College, Cam-
bridge; and the Saint Louis University School of Law. 
1 Throughout this study, unless otherwise indicated, the term "Statute of 
Wills" refers to both the Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (1540), 3 STATUTES 
OF THE REALM 744-46 (hereinafter "Stat. Wills"), and the Explanation of the Stat-
ute of Wills, 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 5 (1542), 3 STATUTES OF THE REALM 901-04 
(hereinafter "Stat. Exp!."). 
There is substantial literature on the legal status and social history of bas- . 
tardy during the sixteenth and seventeenth century, a topic not addressed by this 
study. See generally Walter J. King, Punishment for Bastardy in Early Seven-
teenth-Century England, 10 ALBION 130-51 (1978); BASTARDY AND ITS COMPARA-
TIVE HISTORY 49 (Peter Laslett, et al. eds., 1980); JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, 
AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1987); WILLIAM CLERKE, THE 
TRIALL OF BASTARDIE (London, 1594); CHRIS GIVEN-WILSON & ALICE CURTEIS, THE 
ROYAL BASTARDS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (1984); R.H. HELlllHOLZ, CANON LAW AND 
THE LAW OF ENGLAND (1987); RALPH A. HOUI.BROOKE, CHURCH COURTS AND THE 
PEOPLE DURING THE ENGLISH REFORMATION 1520-1570 (1979); THE ENGLISH FAMI-
LY 1450-1700 (1984); MARTIN INGRAM, CHURCH COURTS, SEX, AND MARRIAGE IN 
ENGLAND, 1570-1640 (1987); PETER LASLETT, FAMILY LIFE AND ILLICIT LOVE IN 
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wardships that would normally be imposed on certain trans-
fers of land to children could be effectively avoided by estab-
lishing that the donee was illegitimate, and therefore a 
stranger to the donor for the purposes of the statute. English 
lawyers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries educated 
their colleagues about this newly available tax loophole. In the 
inns of court, they discussed the statutory provisions and re-
cent revenue cases from the Court of Wards. They considered 
hypothetical situations to define who was and who was not a 
bastard for the purposes of the statute. The first part of this 
study will briefly set this tax loophole in the general institu-
tional context of both the Statute of Wills and the common 
law educational system in England. The second part of the 
article· examines the problem of how being an illegitimate 
child of a donor created a favorable tax situation under the 
Statute of Wills. Concluding observations will then show how 
this example sheds light on the relationship between the inns 
and the courts, and on how these institutions overlapped and 
interacted as they grappled with interpreting ambiguous stat-
utory language. 
I. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
The English Statute of Wills of 1540 must be seen as one 
of many statutory enactments resulting from the Henrician 
Reformation, the dissolution of the monasteries, and Henry 
VIII's effective program to increase royal revenues. Although 
other forms of wealth were appearing in English society dur-
ing these years, land and rights in land continued to be the 
context in which most wealth was perceived. Transfers of 
land, particularly upon the death of the owner, were conve-
nient points to assess and collect feudal incidents and royal 
prerogative rights, which were by this date expressed in mon-
ey payments.2 Many of Henry's political maneuvers and sub-
EARLIER GENERATIONS (1977); IVY PINCHBECK & MARGARET HEWITT, CHILDREN IN 
ENGLISH SOCIETY VOLUME I: FROM TunOR TIMES TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
(1969); LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800 
(1977). 
2 The political and fiscal considerations leading to the Statute of Wills and 
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sequent enactments attempted to reimpose such incidents. In 
fact, the Statute of Wills is most accurately viewed as a taxa-
tion statute that happened to create the right to devise a cer-
tain portion ofland.3 
Two relevant aspects of this period's unprecedented statu-
tory activity must be noted. First, new statutes provided for 
the creation of new institutions of administration and adjudi-
cation, such as the Court of Wards. Second, new statutory 
provisions called for authoritative interpretations by the pro-
fession. The method of legal education in the inns of court 
concerning the manner in which readings on statutes were 
conducted changed accordingly. Readings became the individu-
al products of the particular reader and often addressed recent 
case interpretations of statutory provisions. This article ad-
dresses one example of this second change which can best be 
understood after considering the general nature of the Court 
of Wards and the readings. 
the Explanation of the Statute of Wills have been treated fully elsewhere. See 
generally 2 J.H. BAKER, THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 192-203 (Selden 
Soc'y vol. 94, 1978); J.M.W. BEAN, THE DECLINE OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 1215-
1540 (1968); AR. Buck, The Politics of Land Law in Tudor England, 1529·1540, 
11 J. LEGAL HIST. 200-17 (1990); N.G. Jones, The Influence of Reuenue Consider-
ations upon the Remedial Practice of Chancery in Trust Cases, 1536-1660, in COM-
MUNITIES AND COURTS IN BRITAIN 1150-1900 99-113 (Christopher Brooks & Mi-
chael Lobban eds., 1997); Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Seuenteenth-Century Reuolution 
in the English Land Law, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 221, 237-39 (1995); Prue Vines, 
Land and Royal Reuenue: The Statute for the Explanation of the Statute of Wills, 
1542·43, 3 AUSTL. J. LEGAL HIST. 113-30 (1997). 
I disagree with Ms. Vines's conclusion concerning the provision addressing 
the testamentary capacity of married women. She states that "the need to clarify 
the position as to capacity resulted not from poor drafting in the Statute of Wills, 
but from the conflict between the ecclesiastical courts and the common law courts 
in relation to wills and estates." Id. at 129. In my view, lawyers saw the problem 
purely within the common law and statutory interpretation as indicated by their 
discussions in the inns of court. M.C. Mirow, Monks and Married Women: The 
Use of the Yearbooks in Defining Testamentary Capacity in Sixteenth- and Sev-
enteenth-Century Readings on Wills, 65 LEGAL HIST. REV. 19-39 (1997). 
3 The statute does not have a single taxing provision, but must be read al-
most in its entirety to determine its operation. 
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A. The Court of Wards 
The predecessors of the Court of Wards and Liveries were 
the individual receivers for the counties under Henry VII, who 
were charged with collecting the king's revenues from ward-
ships and other incidents of lands held of him.4 Centralized 
control over the collection and administration of these inci-
dents grew during the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII, 
and by 1528, a Master of the Wards sat regularly at Westmin-
ster, conducted judicial business, and was assisted by an at-
torney.6 The statutes creating the Court of Wards are seen as 
formalizing a pre-existing institution whose main activities 
were increased substantially by two legislative changes: on 
one side, the Statute of Uses and Statute of Wills, and on the 
other, the requirement that grants of monastic lands by the 
Court of Augmentations be held in knight-service in chief 
tenure." Thus, the decisions of the court provided the most 
current interpretations of the statutory provisions concerning 
wardship and other incidents and therefore should have been 
essential material for a student of such statutes. 
At least two of the readers studied here had positions 
with the court. Robert Nowell, who read in 1561, was appoint-
ed the Attorney of the Court of Wards that same year.7 Hugh 
Hare, with his apparently more industrious brother John, was 
appointed Clerk of the court in 1589.8 Furthermore, any of 
the readers later made serjeants or judges of the common law 
courts might have been involved in deciding a case.9 Whatev-
er the personnel used to reach a decision, it was "normally 
embodied in a formal decree of the court."10 Another reader of 
note on the Statute of Wills was Henry Sherfield. His success-
' H.E. BELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND RECORDS OF THE COURT 
OF WARDS AND LIVERIES 5-6 (1953). 
' Id. at 12. 
' The two statutes are 32 Hen. VIII, c. 46, and 33 Hen. VIII, c. 22. BELL, 
supra note 4, at 14. 
1 Id. at 22, n. 4. 
' Id. at 26-27. 
' Id. at 98. 
" Id. at 100. 
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ful practice before the Court of Wards has been recounted by 
Prest, and his iconoclastic church window smashing has been 
illuminated by the work of Slack.11 Reading on the Statute of 
Wills also served James Dyer, John Popham, and Augustine 
Nicholls well; each was to have a successful judicial career. 
Aside from the pleadings in the cases, the most important 
official documents preserving the workings of the Court of 
Wards are the Books of Orders which are relatively complete, 
and the Books of Decrees which run from about 1572 to 
1645.12 Supplementing these records are the manuscript re-
ports of decrees for cases from 1553 to 1581 by John Hare.13 
James Ley was Attorney of the Court of Wards from 1608 to 
1621; his reports of seventy-five cases from the reigu of James 
I, subsequently published in 1659, and his Learned Treatise 
Concerning Wards and Liveries (published 1641 and 1642) are 
useful sources.14 The Court was abolished in 1646.15 
B. Readings 
Educational activities in the inns of court ranged from 
informal student-run gatherings to elaborate, ritualistic events 
conducted by senior members of the profession. The readings 
were the most formal, and perhaps the most technical or so-
phisticated, of these activities.16 Within the inns, the period 
u WILFRID R. PREST, THE RISE OF THE BARRISTERS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
ENGLISH BAR, 1590-1640 30-34 (1986). Paul Slack, The Public Conscience of Henry 
Sherfield, in PUBLIC DU'l'Y AND PRIVATE CONSCIENCE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY 
ENGLAND 151-71 (John Morrill, et al. eds., 1993); Religion Protest and Urban Au-
thority: The Case of Henry Sherfield, Iconoclast, 1633, in 9 STUDIES IN CHURCH 
HISTORY 295-302 (Derek Baker ed., 1972); Poverty and Politics in Salisbury 1597· 
1666, in CRISIS AND ORDER IN ENGLISH TOWNS, 1500-1700 164-203 (P. Clark & P. 
Slack eds., 1972). 
12 BELL, supra note 4, at 87 -88. 
" Id. at 90. CUL MSS Dd.3.9, Hh.3.1, and li.5.7. 
" Apart from Bell's study, see JOEL HURSTFIELD, THE QUEEN'S WARDS; WARD-
SHIP AND MARRIAGE UNDER ELIZABETH I (2d ed. 1973) for a general description of 
the court and wardships. 
15 BELL, supra note 4, at 150. 
16 Case-putting, bolts, and moots were the law student's "daily fare" according 
to Prest or his "bread and butter" according to Lemmings. DAVID LEMMINGS, GEN-
TLEMEN AND BARRISTERS: THE INNS OF COURT AND THE ENGLISH BAR, 1680-1730 
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during a reading was a time for education, institutional pro-
motion, and social functions. Readings delivered an intensive 
dose of legal learning to the audience, gave the reader an 
opportunity to display his knowledge, were closely associated 
with a senior utter-barrister's elevation to bencher of an inn, 
and provided convenient times for the members of the profes-
sion to dine together. 17 
Despite their depth of analysis and legal complexity, the 
readings contain similar material to that found in the less 
formal exercises. Even in this later period of original author-
ship, readers might borrow substantial portions of text from 
earlier readings on the same or similar topics.18 It is very 
likely that they were accessible to their audience, pedagogical-
ly valuable, and after their delivery provided relatively cohe-
sive statements of law in a particular area. 19 Thus, the read-
ings can properly be regarded as one end-point of the continu-
um of the inns' educational devices, and, in many instances, 
the most sophisticated treatments of contemporary topics 
available. 
A reading was a structured exegesis of a statute or a 
particular provision of a statute. Although before this period 
there was a pattern or cycle to the statutes selected as the 
77 (1990); WILFRID R. PREST, THE INNS OF COURT UNDER ELIZABETH I AND THE 
EARLY STUARTS, 1590-1640 117-19 (1972); See also W.C. RICHARDSON, A HISTORY 
OF THE INNS OF COURT: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PERIOD OF THE RENAIS-
SANCE 128-66 (1978). Almost all exercises and lectures were oral, with very little 
emphasis being placed on the production of written work. Id. at 100. A useful 
survey of the exercises in the inns of chancery and the inns of court and of the 
relationship between the two types of inns during this period is found in 2 J.H. 
BAKER, THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 125-35 (Selden Soc'y vol. 94, 1978). 
17 While one might suppose that reading was a necessary prerequisite to ele-
vation to the bench, evidence indicates that utter-barristers could be made 
benchers first with the obligation later imposed to read. Ives even describes this 
as a "regular proceduren in Lincoln's Inn. E.W. Ives, Promotion in the Legal Pro-
fession of Yorkist and Early Tudor England, 75 LAW Q. REV. 348, 351 (1959). 
" J.H. BAKER, JOHN SPELMAN'S READING ON Quo WARRANTO xvi-xxi (Selden 
Soc'y vol. 113, 1997). 
19 M.C. Mirow, The Ascent of the Readings: Some Evidence from the Readings 
on Wills, in LEARNING THE LAW: TEACHING AND THE TRANSMISSION OF ENGLISH 
LAW, 1150-1900 227-54 (Jonathan A. Bush & Alain Wijffels, eds., 1999). 
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topics for the readings, by the date of the readings studied 
here, readers apparently had free choice in selecting their 
statutes. The presentation and content of readings changed 
throughout the life of the institution, and it is generally 
agreed that the addressing of new statutes marked a new era 
in the readings.20 
The fullest contemporary account of readings in the inns 
of court describes a substantially similar procedure in all the 
inns: 
And then the first day after Vacation, after 8 of the clock, he 
that is so chosen to read openly in the Hall before all the 
company shall read some one such act, or statute, as shall 
please him to ground his whole Reading on, for all that vaca-
tion; and that done, doth declare such inconveniences and 
mischiefs as were unprovided for and now by the same stat-
ute be amended; and then reciteth certain doubts and ques-
tions which he has devised that may grow upon the said stat-
ute, and declareth his judgment therein. That done, one of the 
younger utter-barristers rehearseth one question propounded 
by the Reader, and doth by way of argument labour to prove 
the Reader's opinion to be against the law.21 
Readings were delivered during the Lent and autumn (or 
summer) learning vacations of an inn. A reader's first reading 
was usually conducted in the autumn, and Lent was the usual 
time for his second, or "double," reading, which was often given 
before the reader was called as a serjeant.22 The second read-
20 Louis A. Knafla, The Matriculation Reuolution and Education at the Inns of 
Court in Renaissance England, in TUDOR MEN AND INSTITUTIONS 232, 252-53 
(Arthur J. Slavin ed., 1972); PREST, supra note 16, at 119-20. 
" REPORT OF NICHOLAS BACON, THOMAS DENTON, AND ROBERT CAREY ON THE 
STATUS OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN ENGLAND, PRESENTED TO THE KING, c. 1540, 
reprinted in RICHARDSON, supra note 16, at 415. For a discussion and edition of 
this report see D.S. Bland, Henry VIII's Royal Commission on the Inns of Court, 
10 J. Soc'¥ PUB. TCHRS. L. 178 (1968). R.M. Fisher, Thomas Cromwell, Dissolu-
tion of the Monasteries, and the Inns of Court, 1534-1540, 14 J. Soc'¥ PUB. 
TCHRS. L. 103 (1980) contains further discussion of the origins of this report and 
editions of related papers concerning Lincoln's Inn and Middle Temple. 
" J.H. BAKER, THE ORDER OF SERJEANTS AT LAW 84-85 (Selden Soc'y Supp. 
Series vol. v, 1984). There were elaborate rules for giving a serjeant elect the 
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ing, several years after the reader's first reading, was consid-
ered to be an even more learned and ceremonial occasion than 
the first. 23 
On the first morning of the reading, the reader entered the 
hall, stood at the cupboard, and took the Oaths of Supremacy 
and Allegiance.24 The sub-lecturer then read the statute, or 
the applicable "branch" thereof, upon which the reader conduct-
ed his reading. The reader delivered a "grave and apologetic" 
speech explaining his choice of the statute and setting forth the 
divisions of his reading. 25 The reader would then set out ten to 
twelve cases on the division, in the form of hypothetical factual 
situations for argument. From a list of these cases, the least 
senior cupboardman would choose one and argue against the 
reader's conclusion.26 The chosen case would then be argued 
up the hierarchy of seniority through the other cupboardmen, 
positioned near the cupboard, and benchers, "who are placed on 
a form opposite the reader."27 The reader then would speak 
defending his position, followed by any judges and serjeants 
present who would "argue" the case chosen.28 Thus, we may 
opportunity to read before the return of his writ. WILLIAM DUGDALE, ORIGINES 
JURIDICIALES, OR HISTORICAL MEMORIALS OF THE ENGLISH LAWS, COURTS OF JUS-
TICE . . . INNS OF COURT AND CHANCERY (London, 2d ed. 1671; first published 
1666). Dugdale made use of the account in JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LE-
GUM ANGLIE 114-21 (photo. reprint 1979) (S.B. Chrimes ed. 1942) (c. 1470) and 
the report quoted above. KENNETH CHARLTON, EDUCATION IN RENAISSANCE ENG-
LAND 172 (1965). Readers were elected from the senior utter-barristers of an inn 
who had held such positions for about ten years, in other words, those who had 
been members of an inn for between sixteen and eighteen years. J .H. BAKER, 
English Legal Profession, 1450-1550, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE COMMON 
LAW 75, 91 (1986). 
"' Richardson, supra note 16, at 106. 
" Id. at 206. The oath was first required by 5 Eliz. c. 1, s. 4 (1563), 4 STAT-
lJTES OF THE REALM 403. In the Inner Temple if attendance was insufficient, the 
reader, benchers, and utter-barristers could amerce those absent and dissolve the 
reading. DUGDALE, supra note 22, at 160. 
25 Id. at 206. A division of the reading was a specific legal question arising 
from the statutory text and was often the subject of one day's lecture. 
26 The cupboardmen were usually the four most senior utter~barristers present 
at the reading. Id. at 203. 
" Id. at 206. 
28 Id. It is not clear whether the judges and serjeants would be attempting to 
support the reader's conclusions or merely arguing the points of law in the case. 
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think of the Inner Temple representation as accurate for the 
method of argumentation in all the inns, "all of which is to be 
done ex tempore pro and con."29 Abbreviated arguments might 
run into the evening.30 
This outlines the first day's events, and the following days 
of the reading were similar. The reading and its argument of 
cases were conducted Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, 
interspersed with feasting and entertaining strangers, often 
"great lords."31 By all accounts and attempted regulations, the 
readings were expensive events. 
At the end of the final day of a reading, the reader would 
deliver a speech which was followed by the most senior 
bencher's remarks. The reader's final speech might have taken 
the form of a repetition or summary of his reading, repeating 
his divisions and perhaps important conclusions.32 The cases 
were then presented for the "division for that day."33 Two 
cupboardmen would argue one case and ask the reader's opin-
ion on the case to be given the next term. 34 In response, the 
reader made a short speech and retired without addressing the 
substance of the case, a symbol of the continuous nature of 
legal education in the inns. This ceremony was followed by a 
Nonetheless, from their position in the hall alone, sitting opposite the benchers 
with their backs to the reader, it seems more likely than not that they would 
support the reader's position. In the Inner Temple a second case would be argued 
in the morning. This was chosen by the most senior utter-barrister or a judge. Id. 
at 160. 
2~ Id. 
30 Id. at 207. In the Inner Temple, at the end of the morning session, the 
"reader delivers his Paper of Cases, for that morning to the puisne Vacation ut. 
ter-barrister, who is to argue one of those cases he likes best, immediately after 
dinner, at the Bench Table end." The utter-barrister would be aided by all the 
barristers present, helping him "to break the case and open the points." After the 
benchers argued, the reader would conclude. Id. at 160. We should not forget that 
"la] reading was also a festive occasion, an opportunity for Wining and dining the 
right people.'" E.W. IVES, THE COMMON LAWYERS OF PRE-REFORMATION ENGLAND: 
THOMAS KEBELL: A CASE STUDY 50 (1983). 
" DUGDALE, supra note 22, at 207. 
32 PREST, supra note 16, at 124. 
" DUGDALE, supra note 22, at 207. 
" Id. at 207-08. 
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procession through the streets and dinner in the hall.as 
The duration of the reading, according to Dugdale, was two 
days less than a fortnight.a• This would provide six reading 
days. Earlier accounts indicate that the common duration was 
between & period of three weeks and three days and a period of 
two weeks.a' 
It was within the context of such readings that the follow-
ing example must be examined. The most important decisions 
concerning the interpretation of the Statute of Wills were in 
the Court of Wards, and the readings in the inns of court pro-
vide the setting for tracing the development of the applicable 
provisions of the Statute. 
II. TRANSFERS TO ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN UNDER THE 
STATUTE OF WILLS 
The permissive language of the Statute of Wills relating to 
devises and acts executed during the lifetime of the donor cre-
ated difficulties in the complex area of wardship. The Statute 
of Wills states that each person 
shall have full and free liberty, power, and authority to give, 
dispose, will, and devise, as well by his last will and testa-
ment in writing, or otherwise by any act executed in his life, 
all his said manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or 
any of them at his free will and pleasure; any law, statute, or 
other thing heretofore had made or used to the contrary not-
withstanding." 
" Id. at 208. 
" Id. at 207. 
" PREST, supra note 16, at 124; J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH 
LEGAL HISTORY 184 (3d ed., 1990); DUGDALE, supra note 22, at 194. Indicating 
that a skeleton of a longer period remained even in Dugdale's day is his note 
that although the reader ends his reading after a fortnight, the associated exer-
cises continue for the "reading month" conducted "by readers or vacationers ... 
as if the Reading has so long continued." Id. at 160. 
38 Stat. Wills, s. 1. Other sections referring to tenures other than socage ten-
ure have similar language but replace "free will and pleasure" with "will and 
pleasure." Stat. Wills, ss. 2, 3, and 4. The Statute of Wills, s. 5, addressing so-
cage tenure, uses again "free will and pleasure." 
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The Statute of Wills adds further language when the land is 
held in knight-service in chief and similar tenures. Here, each 
person may 
give, dispose, will or assign two parts of the same manors, 
lands, tenements, or hereditaments in three parts divided ... 
to and for the advancement of his wife, preferment of his chil-
dren, and payment of his debts, or otherwise at his will and 
pleasure; any law, statute, custom, or other thing to the con-
trary notwithstanding." 
The third part not transferred under this provision was subject 
to wardship, primer seisin, and livery. 
The Explanation of the Statute of Wills repeats this lan-
guage with these purposes in its preamble and then incorpo-
rates the language of the Statute of Wills in its section on 
wardship. The Explanation of the Statute of Wills speaks of a 
donor's 
gift, disposition, or devise by his last will in writing, or other-
wise by any act or acts lawfully executed in his life, to his 
wife, children, or otherwise.40 
These provisions created wardship obligations where none 
had existed before their enactment. Ley states that there is "no 
dying seised, nor descent" but nonetheless there is "wardship 
during the minority."41 Concerning this provision, Bell states: 
[l)f the statutes had given the subject a limited freedom to 
devise, they had also given the king certain wardships and 
primer seisins, where he would have had none before-that is, 
on one third of land conveyed during life for the purposes 
mentioned in the statute. Thus the statutes and the common 
law were to some extent contradictory, and much learning 
was displayed in argument as to whether or not, in a particu-
lar case, an heir was in ward or should sue livery.42 
" Stat. Wills, ss. 2 and 3 (emphasis added). Stat. Wills, ss. 4 and 5 state "in 
manner and form as above declared." 
'
0 Stat. Expl., preamble and s. 4. 
" J. LEY, A LEARNED TREATISE CONCERNING WARDS AND LIVERIES 25 (1641). 
'
2 BELL, supra note 4, at 107. 
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Thus, the contemporary practitioner was presented with a new 
statute creating new financial responsibilities to the king. 
These were, no doubt, important provisions, which were subse-
quently litigated. As the following discussion indicates, the 
interpretation of these provisions was not obvious. 
The words "or otherwise" were the source of much difficul-
ty, and it was not for another thirty-five years that their inter-
pretation would be settled. From the plain language of the 
statute, it was unclear to what "or otherwise" referred: did the 
statute mean that any disposition by will or by the lifetime act 
of the donor for any purpose should incur primer seisin or 
wardship for land held by knight-service in chief? Clearly, 
when land held in knight-service in chief was devised or given 
in the lifetime of,,the donor for the stated purposes, the inci-
dents were due to the king. In 1548-49, the first judicial inter-
pretation of this provision indicated a broad reading of the 
language to make any transfer taxable: 
Note, for law by the Chancellor of England and justices, that 
if the tenant who holds of the king in knight-service in capite, 
gives all his land to a stranger, by act executed in his life, 
and dies; yet the ki'ng shall have the third part in ward, and 
shall have the heir in ward if he be within age. And if of full 
age, he shall have primer seisin of the third part, by virtue of 
that clause in the statute "Saving to the king ward, primer 
seisin, livery" and the like, by which it appears that the in-
tent of the act is that the king shall have as much as if the 
tenant had made a will, and had died seised. Yet by all, after 
the king is served of his duty of it, the gift is good to the 
donee against the heir.43 
Here, even apart from the three purposes expressed in the act, 
wardship, primer seisin, and livery attach to any disposition of 
land held in knight-service in chief. If this interpretation was 
followed, further discussion on the provision would have been 
unnecessary. 
" Anon. (1548-49), 2 Edw. VI, Brooke's New Cases 179, 73 E.R. 925. 
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By 1561, however, this interpretation of the statute was 
being questioned. A reader in Gray's Inn, Robert Nowell, pro-
vided some thoughts on the nature of conveyances during the 
donor's life ("acts executed") in relation to wills as part of his 
reading on the Statute of Wills: 
And therefore the cause wherefore acts executed are made 
mention of in this statute is not to the intent to give men 
power to convey their lands away which they might do before, 
but to bring the saying which follows after for the advantage 
of the prince and the lord giving as it seems the third part in 
every case and upon every conveyance made mention of before 
by act executed where the heir is within age, the land is held 
by knight-service, to the intent that the prince and the lord 
by knight-service might receive a benefit of a third part upon 
conveyance by act executed as they sustained the loss of two 
parts upon conveyance by last will and testament. And the 
conveyances by act executed in this statute are not simply and 
generally all manner of conveyance by act executed, but [are) 
those conveyances within [the statute) and properly are most 
like to wills and do provide a remedy for those things which 
men most commonly provide for in wills, for their wives, chil-
dren and payment of their debts, for the words of the statute 
be that a man shall have full power and authority by any act 
lawfully executed to give and dispose will and assign etc. to 
and for the advancement of his wife, preferment of his chil-
dren, and payment of his debts or otherwise at his will and 
pleasure. 44 
Thus, by 1561, lawyers were arguing for a more restricted 
reading of the statute's application. Only transfers for the spe-
cific reasons stated in the statute were to produce the imposi-
tion of a payment to the crown. Of the three specific purposes 
expressed in the statute, the meaning of "advancement of chil-
dren" was apparently put before the courts most often.45 The 
•• BL MS Harley 829, f. 28 (emphasis added). 
" Why the terminology changed from "preferment of children" in the statute 
to "advancement of children" in the contemporary language of the practitioner is 
not known. This study follows the lawyers rather than the statute in this regard. 
For advancement of a wife, see Floyer's Case (1611), Hi!. 8 Jae. 1, 9 Co. Rep. 
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question presented in these cases was whether certain persons 
should be considered "lawful generation" for the purposes of 
advancing children within the language of the statutes. The 
phrase "lawful generation" is found in the preamble of the 
Statute of Wills, and if an advancement to a child of lawful 
generation was established, wardship or primer seisin would 
attach for the conveyance of land held in knight-service in 
chief. Thus, the crucial issue was the applicability of the sec-
tions of the statutes dealing with wardship and the suing of 
liveries for lands "advanced" to certain family members during 
the lifetime of the donor. A significant body of law developed 
around the question of what was or was not advancement un-
der various circumstances, but in the late 1560s and early 
1570s, the law was still open to varying interpretations. 
An early case interpreting this provision is from 1568. A 
manuscript of Henry Blanchard's reading in 1581 records that 
an estate executed to a bastard daughter or son was not within 
the statute as it regards wardship and the suing of livery. For 
this proposition he cited the case of Dame Woodhouse.46 Al-
though the case is not available in printed reports, Hare's 
manuscript reports of Court of Wards cases contain the follow-
ing entry from 1568: 
Madam Woodhouse being seised of the manor of A. held in 
knight-service in chief made feoffment of this in consideration 
of marriage to be entered between Ursula, base daughter of 
the said Madam, and William Cotton to the use of him for his 
life, the remainder to the said William and Ursula in tail, the 
remainder to the right heirs. The said Madam Woodhouse 
dies having issue, Dudley Arundell by her second husband, 
and her daughter as heir. The which matter was found ac-
cordingly by office upon the death of the Madam, upon which 
office the said auditor understanding that the said Ursula 
125b, 77 E.R. 913, where advancement given to a woman in contemplation of 
marriage is held within the statutory definition of "wife." 
" CUL MS Hh.2.1, f. 72. The case of Madam Woodhouse is noted at 73 E.R. 
776 as being located in the Decree Book of the Court of Wards at f. 327 for the 
Trinity term of 10 Eliz. (1568). This Decree Book which corresponds to P.R.O. 
Ward 9/83 has been classified as "unfit for production" by the P.R.O. 
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shall be said one of the daughters of the said Madam and 
[therefore) issue within the Statute of Wills, charged the third 
part for fault of livery. But upon grand advice and deliverance 
of the justices on this point they resolve that the said base 
daughter shall take this land as a mere stranger and not as 
any child {of] the said Madam as issue. The conveyance [was 
made] out of the power of the aforesaid statute upon which she 
made discharge by decree of livery etc.47 
By 1568, a bastard daughter would not be considered a child 
for the purposes of assessing wardship or suing livery upon 
advancement by act executed during the life of the parent. 
A second similar case is from 1570.48 There, land held in 
knight-service was conveyed to the bastard son of the donor, 
but the son was "not called bastard or son to the donor."49 
Finding that the bastard son was out of the statute's applica-
tion, the court stated: 
And as it seems the bastard shall be out of the statute, be-
cause he is, but as any other person, a mere stranger to the 
father, quia filius nullius. And the preamble of 32 Henry VIII 
[c. l) rehearseth "lawful generation."'0 
Consistent with Madam Woodhouse on the question of the 
applicability of the statute to bastard sons, its focus on the fact 
that the bastard was not recognized or accepted as the son the 
donor is notable. The donor's or public's perception of the famil-
ial relationship appears to have been a consideration in the 
proper characterization of the son. 
Other related provisions of the Statute of Wills were being 
debated that same year. Dyer reports a discussion of these 
provisions in the Court of Wards in 1570.51 This discussion 
indicates that after more than twenty-five years from the en-
" CUL MS Ii.5.17, ff. 3lv-32 (emphasis added). 
" Anon. (1570), Mich. 12 & 13 Eliz., 3 Dyer 296b, 73 E.R. 666. This case is a 
few months later than the first discussion of the question of collateral relatives in 
the Hilary term of 12 Elizabeth addressed next. 
49 Id. 
" 73 E.R. 666. 
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actment of the statutes the law on this subject was unsettled. 
The general question concerned advancements "in consideration 
of natural love and affection to his kindred and blood" with 
lp.nds held in knight-service in chief. A relative other than one 
in the direct family line presented a difficult case. The judges 
were divided: 
And in a meeting of all the judges at Serjeants Inn, it was 
holden by Onslow Attorney of the Wards, Wray, and Barham 
the Queen's serjeant, Harper Justice, Welshe Justice, 
Saunders Chief Baron, and Dyer Chief Justice of the Bench, 
that children's children, and so on, descending in a right line, 
are within the statute etc., and this by the words in the pre-
amble, "generations, family, children, and posterity."52 And 
Dyer also thought that collateral cousins should be in the 
same predicament. But Keilwey Surveyor of the Liveries, 
Carns, Southcot, Weston, and Whiddon Justices, contra, in 
both points, etc. and Catlin Chief Justice also: but Saunders 
Chief Baron, only in one as above. And in next Trinity, in the 
lodgings of Secretary Cecil, Master of the Wards, near the 
Savoy, the case was argued for four hours and half, and the 
opinions [were] as above, except Carns, who changed his opin-
ion. 53 
Thus, at the beginning of 1570, there was little agreement 
about how the statute was to be interpreted on this point. 
These were also questions considered to be worth long and 
repeated debate by the country's top judiciary. It should be 
noted that Dyer read the statute broadly to include children's 
children and collateral cousins. The important point for our 
purposes is that the interpretation of the three purposes clearly 
had become more restrictive, excluding strangers and others 
from its application. The discussion examines twice the statuto-
ry language regarding the three purposes of the disposition, 
once to note its presence in the Statute of Wills, and again to 
note its absence in the individual section of the Explanation of 
52 These words are used in isolation from each other in the Statute of Wills, 
preamble. 
" 73 E.R. 643. 
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the Statute of Wills concerning knight-service in chief: 
Also, in the third article of the Statute of Explanations, 34 & 
35 Henry VIII [c.5] it is declared and enacted that the king's 
tenants in chief hath, and by that act shall have authority to 
dispose, etc., to any person or persons (except bodies politic 
and corporate) by will or writing, or act executed in life, two 
parts, etc. omitting the words, "to and for the advancement of 
the wife, preferment of the children, payment of the debts, or 
otherwise." Wherefore, etc. Therefore, note the generality, etc. 
And Cecil argued sensibly to the same intent.54 
Considering the recital of these requirements in the clause 
creating the saving to the king, it is a puzzling argument." It 
is not surprising, however, to find Cecil, as Master of the 
Wards, arguing for a broad application of the statute. 
Despite these discussions and although there were four 
other readers on the Statute of Wills in the inns of court be-
tween 1561 and 1581, it appears that it was not until 
Blanchard's reading of 1581 that the possible issues were given 
a full treatment. This was most likely due to the rapidly devel-
oping case law in the area at that time and the increasing 
availability of reports.56 After Blanchard's reading, the read-
ings routinely provide a summary of the major issues of ad-
vancement under the statute. 
The question of whether a bastard was "lawful generation" 
was presented again in a case which became known as Gray's 
Case.57 The case concerned Edward Gray who was Lord 
.. 73 E.R. 643. 
" Stat. Exp!., s. 4. 
56 Many factual variations are presented in the reader's cases in St John's 
College, Cambridge MS 5.28, ff. 55-58. MSS of Blanchard's reading also provide 
good narrative discussions of the topic. BL MS Add. 16169, ff. 262v-263v and BL 
MS Add. 35951, ff. 21v-24. Dyer's reports were printed in 1585, but manuscript 
reports circulated before this date. 
" Gray's Case (1572), Trin. 14 Eliz., 3 Dyer 313b, 73 E.R. 711 (also called 
Lord Powis's Case). The MS of Dyer's reports indicates that the case was decided 
by all the judges, including Saunders, C.B. and Bacon, L.K. (except Corbett, J.) 
and was argued in both the Chancery and the Court of Wards. 1 J .H. BAKER, 
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Powis's bastard son and who received a remainder in land held 
in chief. At least two important questions were presented. The 
first was whether a bastard son could take under the language 
of a gift which stated "to the son." The second concerned 
whether a bastard would have to sue livery to take the remain-
der, a question directly related to the statute. A manuscript 
report of the case demonstrates that a bastard could be a valid 
purchaser under the language described and evidently placed 
considerable weight on the fact that he was "commonly reputed 
and taken as son of the said Lord Powis."58 Concerning the 
second question, the printed version of Dyer's report of the case 
states "and he shall not sue livery, because he is as a stranger, 
and not a lawful issue."59 Therefore, Edward was a son for 
some purposes (to take the property), but not for others (to sue 
livery). This language appears to have been sufficient justifica-
tion for readers to state generally that a bastard was "not with-
in the statute." Nonetheless, there was some later confusion 
about which of these two separate issues was addressed, and 
how they were resolved, by this case. 
Gray became a popular case to cite for questions concern-
ing the status of bastards, and readings before the case do not 
consider the advancement of a bastard under the statute. John 
Popham used the case in 1573 first to examine a disputed son's 
right to take under a gift, the non-taxation aspect of the case. 
Discussing a reader's case involving a son born overseas, 
Popham used Gray by way of analogy to examine the difference 
between a son recognized by the law and a son "according to 
the common opinion.''"0 Supporting his conclusion that the 
alien son, later made a denizen, may take by a devise of the 
father to "his son," Popham stated: 
And this is the older [alien-born] son only, and he may well 
be purchaser by such name, although the law does not count 
him to be a son in fact, yet he is his son according to the 
common opinion. And so accepted, it is sufficient for him to 
5s Id. 
" 73 E.R. 711. 
" BL MS Hargrave 89, f. 4v. 
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make a purchase by such name. As is the case of one, a mere 
bastard, which was adjudged in the case of Gray bastard son 
of Lord Powes.61 
This use of Gray was based on the discussion found in the 
manuscript report, the report addressing the question of wheth-
er a bastard may be a purchaser, and .was distinct from the 
applicability of the statute to a gift to a bastard from a parent. 
Popham's next use of the case addressed the question of 
advancement. The applicable part of his reader's case states: 
The disseisee reenters and enfeoffs his bastard son born be-
tween him and his wife before the coverture.62 
The question was whether this feoffinent of land held in 
knight-service in chief to a bastard son constituted an advance-
ment for the purposes of assessing wardship. Finding that it 
should be considered an advancement within the statute, 
Popham stated: 
[l]t seems that this bastard is such person as the statute 
intends, because such a bastard may in cases inherit land as 
it appears by 20 Assize 663 and by Littleton, 96. And such by 
the spiritual law shall be called a son. And for these reasons, 
[it is] clearly within the case of the statute. And it appears an 
even stronger case than [where] one who is a mere bastard is 
within the case of the statute because such appears by the 
case now lately adjudged upon the assurance made by the 
late Lord Pow es to his bastard. 64 
Here, although citing Gray, it appears that Popham had come 
to the opposite conclusion of the decision as found in the print-
ed reports of Dyer. Popham's use of canon law is noteworthy. 
Because under canon law the son would be legitimated by the 
s1 Id. 
" BL MS Hargrave 89, f. 16. 
" BL MS Lansdowne 1133 reads "2 Assize p. 9." 
64 BL MS Hargrave 89, f. 16. A reader's case and discussion involving bastard 
daughters, but not dealing with advancement, is found at f. 19. 
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parents' subsequent marriage, Popham asserted that the trans-
action was taxable. Thus, this conclusion by Popham and the 
1570 discussion quoted at the beginning of this article indicate 
that the interpretation of the statute was still unsettled. 
In 1575 another case was decided in the Court of Wards 
that accorded with the decision of Madam Woodhouse's Case. In 
Thornton's Case, a mother during her lifetime gave land held in 
knight-service to her bastard daughter.65 Here Saunders, 
Kingsmill, and Keilwey held that "the Queen shall not have 
any third part in this case, because she is not a lawful daugh-
ter, or child of the mother more than of the father." Dyer, how-
ever, doubted this decision.66 This not only indicates a linger-
ing doubt about the application of the statute to advancements 
of bastards, but also Dyer's continuing inclusive interpretation 
of the statutory language. 
Although he did not cite Gray, Blanchard in 1581 inter-
prets the law to be in accordance with what would· 1ater be 
found in the printed report of the case. A manuscript of 
Blanchard's reading accurately records the status of a bastard 
under Gray as printed: 
An act executed to a bastard son for his advancement is not 
an advancement meant by the statute and the king shall not 
have the wardship of any part.67 
Nonetheless, by this date Gray was just one among many cases 
which could support this statement, and another manuscript of 
the reading cites Madam Woodhouse for the proposition that an 
estate executed to a bastard son or daughter is not within the 
meaning of the statute.68 For example, it is likely that 
Blanchard used a case reported by Dyer, as the following entry 
" Thornton's Case (1575), Mich. 17 & 18 Eliz., 3 Dyer 345a, 73 E.R. 776. 
" 73 E.R. 776. 
" BL MS Add 35951, f. 20v. Two other manuscripts record a reader's case in 
which the entry of a bastard apparently cut off the right of the lord to wardship. 
CUL MS Hh.2.1, f. 77v; and St John's College, Cambridge MS 5.28, f. 59v. Anoth-
er MS notes that an estate executed to a bastard son or daughter is not within 
the statute. BL MS Add. 16169, f. 262v. 
" CUL MS Hh.2.1, f. 72. 
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is found in a list of cases vouched by Blanchard during his 
reading: 
A woman has issue, a bastard daughter, and she herself is 
seised of lands held of the queen in chief. She executes estate 
of all [her land] to her bastard daughter in fee and dies. And 
it was adjudged in the Court of Wards that the queen shall 
not have any part, by the advice of Lord Dyer and Lord 
Saunders by the report of Lord Dyer [of] 19 Elizabeth.69 
Professor Baker states that this language suggests that Dyer 
was orally reporting the case from his own notes. If so, Dyer's 
view on the subject appears to have shifted towards a more 
exclusionary reading of the statute. In any event, the passage 
gives a partial citation to and an accurate reporting of the 
holding in Thornton. 
The only manuscript of Robert Gardiner's reading of 1584 
indicates that the topic of bastardy was also raised there. 
Gardiner presented the issue in a reader's case involving a 
bastard eigne ("older son") and a legitimate younger son, a 
factual pattern found in many readers' cases. Unfortunately, 
the argument of the case is not recorded, although the arrange-
ment of the text in the manuscript indicates that the case was 
argued.7° As the reader's case involves the bastard eigne dis-
seising the father and the father subsequently releasing all his 
right to the bastard, one issue clearly raised by the case was 
the advancement of the bastard during the life of the father. 
John Shirley in 1588 also considered the implications of 
bastardy as it related to an advancement of a child. Although 
the issue is not explicitly presented in his reader's cases, two 
records of the argument reveal that it was discussed. The first 
reference to the topic found is 
(i]f a mother of a bastard conveys land to the bastard, al-
though he be in notice of the world her son, this is not ad-
vancement because he is not of "lawful generation. "71 
" BL MS Add. 35951, f. 14v. 
" LI MS Misc. 367, p. 73. 
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Here, Shirley has accurately stated the rule derived from two 
of the cases presented. The elements of this statement are the 
mother's conveyance (Thornton) and a bastard son publicly 
known as such (Gray). 
A second manuscript of the reading also contains a refer-
ence to the topic: 
A bastard is not a child within this statute because the words 
of the statute are "lawful generation."72 
Thus, even when the reader's case did not expressly raise the 
issue, readers or those arguing the readers' cases believed that 
it was an issue worth presenting. The example of Shirley's 
reading demonstrates the use of Gray and its progeny without 
a citation to the cases. Perhaps by 1588 any sensational quality 
of the case had died; no one now cared that Edward Gray was 
the bastard of Lord Powis, and there were now several cases 
that could be cited for this same principle. Nonetheless, the 
legal principle was important enough for its inclusion in the 
readings to continue. The section of the reading which present-
ed this issue sets out fully other advancement issues as well, 
such as whether a grant benefiting the wife of the son is ad-
vancement to the son within the statute.73 No doubt, when a 
reader came to read on the provision concerning acts executed 
during the life of the donor, he and his audience expected to 
cover the general law surrounding advancement. 
For his reading, Hugh Hare appears to have copied sub-
stantial portions of Popham's reading without making sure his 
statements were current. This is the only example of wholesale 
copying found among the readings on the Statute of Wills. 
Hare's reliance on Popham's reading got him into difficulty 
concerning the law of bastardy. Dyer's Reports had been pub-
lished more than six years before the date of Hare's reading, 
1592. The basic principle of law on the topic was settled, not 
only by Gray but by later cases and the expositions found in 
" BL MS Add. 16169, f. 367v. 
" CUL MS Ee.4.5, f. 49. 
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the readings after Popham: Generally, a bastard was not with-
in the language of the statute, although a bastard was suffi-
cient to take as a purchaser under a gift which recited "son." 
Nonetheless, Hare, copying from Popham's reading, misstated 
the law: 
And this bastard is such son as this statute intends, because 
such bastard may in cases be inheritable to land. And by the 
spiritual law shall be called son and thereby clearly within 
the case of the statute. But if he was a mere bastard who by 
no possibility may be his heir and of whom the law never 
takes account as of a stranger, it shall be otherwise than this 
case is put. The wardship of the heir and of the land shall be 
given to the king.74 
This demonstrates further Hare's unquestioning reliance on 
Popham's reading. It seems an odd mistake for someone about 
to step into a high position in the Court of Wards. 
Augustine Nicholls's reading of 1602 presents the following 
analysis: · 
An estate executed to a bastard is not within the statute. 
Dyer, 313, 296. But an estate executed to a bastard eigne is 
within this statute [because] a covenant by natural affection 
shall raise a use to him. But if a man takes a second wife, the 
first wife living, and has issue by her, such son is not within 
the statute and he is a mere bastard.75 
Here Nicholls has set out the general principle citing Gray and 
the anonymous case decided in 1570 addressing bastardy. His 
statements continue with the complicating factors of natural 
affection towards a relative and, it appears, divorce for precon-
tract. 
The status of a bastard for the purposes of advancement 
and the third due to the king is also considered in Henry 
Sherfield's reading of 1624: 
And lawful children and no others are those who are meant 
" BL MS Lansdowne 1141, f. 40. 
" LI MS Maynard 19(b), f. 5v. 
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by the law. And a child by reputation only is not within [the 
statute] but he must be a child in law and truth. Thus a bas-
tard child although he be of his mother is not a child within 
the law, because the statute provides for their "lawful genera-
tion. "76 
The question arose again later in a reader's case in which a son 
was arguably made a bastard by divorce for precontract, a 
factual twist also used by Nicholls: 
Response to the third objection that by the divorce the issue 
is a bastard, and thus A. is not a child within the law. I have 
argued to the contrary before and therefore nothing more 
shall be said on this point. But if it were thus, perhaps this 
would be a child within the law. As if a man makes a convey-
ance for the advancement of his wife and after there is a 
divorce by reason of precontract, this is within the law, be-
cause she is a wife by reputation. And if there is a recovery 
against such husband and wife, shall a divorce afterwards 
[affect the recovery] according to this act? Certainly not. Rela-
tion shall not make a wrong to destroy a settled estate. And 
Popham holds accordingly as to the wife in his reading upon 
this statute. 
I wish to confess that a bastard is out of this statute, but this 
is to be understood as such bastard who was both in truth 
and reputation a bastard always. But as I have argued before 
[there is] no question that the issue after a divorce by reason 
of precontract of the husband, whereof the wife knew nothing, 
shall be always legitimate and shall inherit [from] the mother 
and the father.77 
76 BL MS Stowe 424, f. 42. The passage continues with related discussion and 
a citation to Sir George Curson's Case (1607), East. 5 Jae. I, 6 Co. Rep. 75b, 77 
E.R. 369, discussing advancements to relatives other than children. 
" BL MS Stowe 424, f. 77v. The passage cites Leonard Lovies's Case (1613), 
East. 11 Jae. 1, 10 Co. Rep. 78a, 77 E.R. 1043, which presents a summary of 
prior case on this point at 77 E.R. 1049-50 and cites Curson's Case among others. 
Concerning the effect of the divorce, Nicholls was following established canon law. 
See R.H. HELMHOLZ, ROMAN CANON LAW IN REFORMATION ENGLAND 6 (1990). The 
statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 38 (1540) on precontracts would have been an important 
part of the analysis of the fact patterns presented by Nicholls and Sherfield. 
CLERKE, supra note 1, at 79-81; and HELMHOLZ, ROMAN CANON LAW, supra, at 
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Sherfield explores the possibility of a divorce creating a bastard 
and the effect of this change of status. 
The last reading on wills, delivered by Richard Townesend 
in 1631, also included the factual situation of a bastard in a 
reader's case. Following this reader's case is a full page of notes 
addressing the topic of bastards under the statute and a hur-
ried list of phrases and citations. These include citations to 
Gray and Thornton which follow the statement, "a bastard is 
no child within 32 Henry VIII of wills although his mother con-
veys lands to him. "78 
Ill. NEW LAW AND POLITICAL POSITIONING 
The factual situation of advancing a bastard child provided 
a frequent topic for readers to present. The interpretation of 
the statute regarding advancement appears to have been of 
general importance for the readers, and the question of ad-
vancement to bastards presented an interesting legal issue, one 
of practical importance and with recent case interpretation. It 
is even possible to speculate as to Dyer's change of mind about 
the interpretation of the statute. Furthermore, it appears that 
the cases were sufficiently new and the principles expounded 
sufficiently important to find their inclusion in many of the 
manuscripts of the readings. 
Readers could use the readings as an opportunity to trans-
mit their interpretation of various statutes for political purpos-
es. The first recorded restrictive interpretation of the statutory 
provision is found in a reading, Robert Nowell's reading in 
Gray's Inn in 1561. Despite this anti-revenue position, Nowell 
was appointed the Attorney of the Court of Wards the same 
year he read.79 Nowell's interpretation was then adopted by 
the Court of Wards seven years later in the decision of Madam 
Woodhouse's Case. This interpretation was repeated in an 
anonymous case from the Court of Wards in 1570 and again in 
74. 
" CUL MS Dd.5.51(d), f. 26v. 
79 BELL, supra note 4, at 22, n. 4. 
370 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69 
Gray's Case in 1572. 
One year after the decision in Gray's Case, John Popham 
presented a similar problem in his reading. Nonetheless, 
Popham argued for a broad application of the statute and cited 
Gray's Case for the opposite rule of law, asserting that a bas-
tard child was within the application of the statute. When 
Popham read, Dyer's reports, which provided the first printed 
report of Gray's Case, were not to appear for several more 
years. Manuscripts and reasonable memories could differ in the 
holding of a case. Popham's argument equates the statutory 
definition of who is a child with the donor's intent and the 
donor's characterization of the donee. Because Popham's exam-
ple dealt with an illegitimate child whose parents later mar-
ried, this interpretation would also harmonize the definition of 
legitimacy under the Statute of Wills with the view of the eccle-
siastical law. Finally, Popham had been appointed to the Privy 
Council in 1571, and perhaps this revenue producing interpre-
tation was consistent with his new office. 
Question concerning the proper interpretation of the provi-
sion lingered into the mid-1570s. Dyer read the provision 
broadly in 1570 and kept to this interpretation in Thornton's 
Case in 1575. Nonetheless, by 1581 it appears that Dyer had 
changed his view according to a manuscript of Henry 
Blanchard's reading. Because Dyer and Blanchard were both 
members of Middle Temple and both readers on the Statute of 
Wills, Dyer may have been in attendance at Blanchard's read-
ing. 
The only reader after Blanchard to argue for a broader 
interpretation of the statute was Hugh Hare, who copied 
Popham's argument. By the time of his reading in 1592, Hare 
had been joint clerk of the Court of Wards for two years, and 
this reading of the statute would be consistent with his posi-
tion. 
Thus, for the most part, from 1581 onwards, the law was 
settled and readers consistently asserted that bastard children 
were outside the application of the statute. The appearance of 
Dyer's report of Gray's Case in 1585 must have done much to 
settle any doubts about this exception, Hugh Hare's reading 
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notwithstanding. 
In an era when statutes were still viewed as "amending 
mischiefs," lawyers were beginning to see that statutory lan-
guage could lead to unintended consequences. The interplay 
between statute and case law was more complex than the ac-
cepted view that statutes adjusted unwanted shifts of the com-
mon law. The manuscripts of the readings also indicate the 
rather fluid way in which case authorities, even after their 
being set into print, were presented, used, interpreted and 
misinterpreted. Using a base of statutory texts, the readings 
provided a critical setting for statutory interpretation within 
the common law tradition, a setting where legal knowledge 
could be displayed, shared, and transmitted. Readings not only 
advanced the political and professional aspirations of the read-
ers, but also served as important bridges between case law and 
statute, between legal education and legal practice . 
